

MEMORANDUM FOR: *DCI*

*Postaw's memo was drafted
and sent prior to Monday's
NSC meeting.*

NSC REVIEWED 8/2/07 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND
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State Dept. review
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

May 2, 1982

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTORSECRETNSC REVIEWED 8/2/07 NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK

THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: START

There is a considerable degree of consensus on our approach to the START negotiations. All agree that START should reduce the number of missile warheads on both sides to 5000, and should limit bombers separately. There is also agreement that START must limit the destructive power of missile warheads, and reduce the substantial Soviet advantage in ICBM throw weight. All of the approaches would one way or another place a ceiling of 2 to 3 million kilograms on missile throw weight.

We are still convinced that the simplest and most readily verifiable way to limit destructive power would be to constrain warhead weight, a notion first suggested by Paul Nitze. The Secretary of Defense's approach would accomplish the same result in a different way.

The approach put forward by the Secretary of State and the JCS is fundamentally different. It would constrain throw weight by sharply reducing the number of deployed missile launchers. There are three serious problems with this approach:

- (1) Tight limits on launchers encourage both sides to place in each launcher the largest missile with the most warheads permitted. The strategic forces of both sides would therefore be concentrated into 850 launchers, each of which contained an SS-19 or M-X class

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missile. In the interest of stability, we should be moving in the opposite direction. Stability would be enhanced by deploying a larger number of smaller missiles, placed in more numerous launchers, which would represent more aim points and therefore be more survivable. This consideration is one of the most fundamental ways to reduce the Soviet Union's present advantage in ICBMs, the main source of political anxiety throughout the Western world.

- (2) Making deployed launchers a primary unit of account would repeat one of the serious mistakes of SALT II.
- (3) The whole State/JCS approach hinges on Soviet agreement to dismantle all of the SS-18 missiles, which would be most difficult to accomplish. The assumption that this could be achieved is the basis of the charts discussed this morning.

We believe that in the end the US approach could include a limit on launchers as part of a final consensus. It should not, however, be one of the key elements of the unit of account, and should not be sharply reduced. Such a ceiling--e.g., 1750 missile launchers--could be justified on verification grounds, rather than as a reductions measure. We should realize, however, that there would be costs in including such a limit in our approach. It might well prevent some desirable solutions of the US ICBM problem, and the gradual shift of both arsenals to smaller weapons compatible with deterrence. The fundamental elements of the unit of account should be warhead number and destructive power, as measured by warhead weight or throw weight.

A sample draft NSDD is attached. I hope it is helpful to you.

Attachment:
As stated.

Engene V. Rostov

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER _____

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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS
(START)

Having considered the recommendation of the National Security Council, which met on April 28, May 3, and May 7, 1982, I have made the following decisions regarding the US position for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

-- As the principal elements of the unit of account for the START Treaty, we will propose (1) that in the first instance the US and USSR reduce the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads to 5000 on each side, and that this be accomplished by phased reductions; and (2) that the destructive power of missile reentry vehicles be reduced by limiting their weight to 200 kg. by a given date; before that date, the weight of the vehicles should be no greater than 450 kg. Individual missile throw weight will be limited to twice warhead weight. This corresponds to a ceiling of 2 million kg. on throw weight.

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- In addition, we will propose a separate limit of 250 heavy bombers.
- (If the President decides to include launcher limits in the instruction, the paragraph could read: "We should propose a limit of no more than 1750 ballistic missiles.")
- The IG is directed to develop positions on the other issues. These positions should be fully congruent with the President's decisions as expressed in this National Security Decision Directive. This congruence should also be contained in Backstopping Committee drafting of START instructions.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



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SOVRB (AND MANY IN
THE WEST) WILL RAISE
QUESTION OF ACCURACY AS
A MEASURE OF RESIDUAL
CAPABILITY —
WHERE / WHAT IS
THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
THROW WEIGHT + ACCURACY?